Intuitive criterion

Results: 35



#Item
11Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Teams: Forward Induction or Faster Adaptive Learning?* David J. Cooper Department of Economics Florida State University

Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Teams: Forward Induction or Faster Adaptive Learning?* David J. Cooper Department of Economics Florida State University

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Source URL: web.econ.ohio-state.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-08-03 09:58:11
12Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas Zachary Grossman∗ Jo¨el van der Weele†  March 15, 2013

Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas Zachary Grossman∗ Jo¨el van der Weele† March 15, 2013

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Source URL: www.econ.ucsb.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-04-03 19:31:22
13False Modesty: When Disclosing Good News Looks Bad∗ Rick Harbaugh Indiana University  Dr. Theodore To

False Modesty: When Disclosing Good News Looks Bad∗ Rick Harbaugh Indiana University Dr. Theodore To

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Source URL: kelley.iu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-01-16 10:56:16
14C:�iles�nalling�ms.I�msd.finalAER.wpd

C:ilesnallingms.Imsd.finalAER.wpd

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Source URL: www.econ.ohio-state.edu

Language: English - Date: 2011-12-15 19:09:29
15Information and the Organization of Markets: Theory and Experiments Tom Wilkening∗,† June 20, 2012  This paper studies the link between market structure and the informativeness of

Information and the Organization of Markets: Theory and Experiments Tom Wilkening∗,† June 20, 2012 This paper studies the link between market structure and the informativeness of

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Source URL: www.tomwilkening.com

Language: English - Date: 2014-08-15 00:43:41
16Learning to Play Bayesian Games1 Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First draft: December 23, 1996 Current revision: July 22, 2002  Abstract

Learning to Play Bayesian Games1 Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First draft: December 23, 1996 Current revision: July 22, 2002 Abstract

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2003-11-04 12:28:39
17Meaning and Credibility in Experimental Cheap-Talk Games∗ Ernest K. Lai Department of Economics Lehigh University [removed]

Meaning and Credibility in Experimental Cheap-Talk Games∗ Ernest K. Lai Department of Economics Lehigh University [removed]

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Source URL: ihome.ust.hk

Language: English - Date: 2015-02-05 20:46:05
18Signaling game / Bayesian game / The Intuitive Criterion / Strategy / Solution concept / Cheap talk / Agent / Economic model / Game theory / Information / Economics

Department of Economics Working Paper Series Location Choice and Information Transmission Simon Loertscher

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Source URL: fbe.unimelb.edu.au

Language: English - Date: 2013-08-05 02:22:00
19Information Economics notes for Econ 8106 Dimitrios Diamantaras Department of Economics Temple University Philadelphia, PA[removed]dimitris [at] temple.edu

Information Economics notes for Econ 8106 Dimitrios Diamantaras Department of Economics Temple University Philadelphia, PA[removed]dimitris [at] temple.edu

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Source URL: www.cogiddo.com

Language: English - Date: 2009-12-23 05:00:36
20Learning to Play Bayesian Games1 Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First draft: December 23, 1996 Current revision: July 22, 2002  Abstract

Learning to Play Bayesian Games1 Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First draft: December 23, 1996 Current revision: July 22, 2002 Abstract

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2003-11-04 12:28:39